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Moral judgment often requiresmaking difficult tradeoffs (e.g., is it appropriate to torture to save the lives of innocents at risk?). Previous
research suggests that both emotional appraisals and more deliberative utilitarian appraisals influence such judgments and that these
appraisals often conflict. However, it is unclear how these different types of appraisals are represented in the brain, or how they are
integrated into an overall moral judgment. We addressed these questions using an fMRI paradigm in which human subjects provide
separate emotional and utilitarian appraisals for different potential actions, and thenmake difficult moral judgments constructed from
combinations of these actions.We found that anterior cingulate, insula, and superior temporal gyrus correlatedwith emotional apprais-
als, whereas temporoparietal junction and dorsomedial prefrontal cortex correlated with utilitarian appraisals. Overall moral value
judgments were represented in an anterior portion of the ventromedial prefrontal cortex. Critically, the pattern of responses and func-
tional interactions between these three sets of regions are consistent with a model in which emotional and utilitarian appraisals are
computed independently and inparallel, andpassed to the ventromedial prefrontal cortexwhere they are integrated into anoverallmoral
value judgment.
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Introduction
Many of the most consequential choices we face involve thorny
questions about the appropriateness ofmoral tradeoffs. Is tortur-
ing a terrorist acceptable if it gains information that saves lives?
How many lives must be saved to justify such an act? The pro-
found consequences of these moral choices has inspired great
interest in understanding their neural, computational, and psy-
chological foundations. Most of this work takes the view that
moral judgment involvesmultiple evaluative processes operating
at different time-scales and levels of complexity (Greene and
Haidt, 2002; Moll et al., 2005). Yet how do these processes inter-
act? How and where are conflicts resolved? Do some processes
operatemore quickly or automatically than others; and if so, how
are outputs from these processes combined into overall moral
judgments?
Most approaches to these questions have focused on compe-
tition between two distinct systems: (1) a fast, intuitive, and
largely emotion-driven system sensitive to specific features of a
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Significance Statement
Popular accounts ofmoral judgment often describe it as a battle for control between two systems, one intuitive and emotional, the
other rational and utilitarian, engaged in winner-take-all inhibitory competition. Using a novel fMRI paradigm, we identified
distinct neural signatures of emotional and utilitarian appraisals and used them to test different models of how they compete for
the control of moral behavior. Importantly, we find little support for competitive inhibition accounts. Instead, moral judgments
resembled the architecture of simple economic choices: distinct regions represented emotional and utilitarian appraisals inde-
pendently and passed this information to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex for integration into an overall moral value signal.
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situation; and (2) a slower deliberative system that reasons logi-
cally about context-specific, utilitarian consequences (Greene et
al., 2001, 2004; Haidt, 2001; Greene, 2005; Cushman, 2013). Al-
though some evidence supports the distinction between these
systems (Greene et al., 2008; Conway andGawronski, 2013), their
neurocomputational basis and their interactions are not fully un-
derstood. For example, are emotional appraisals the primary
drivers of our moral sense, with utilitarian responses limited to
post hoc justifications (Haidt, 2001; Wheatley and Haidt, 2005)?
Do the appraisal systems compete through mutual inhibition,
with the winner taking control of behavior (Greene et al., 2004;
Cushman, 2013)? Or do moral judgments resemble simple eco-
nomic choices, such that emotional and utilitarian appraisals are
computed independently in different areas and passed to areas
that integrate them into an overall value judgment (Fehr and
Rangel, 2011; Lim et al., 2013; Rangel and Clithero, 2014)?
We addressed these questions using an fMRI paradigm in
which human subjects provide separate emotional and utilitarian
appraisals for different potential actions, and then make difficult
moral judgments constructed from combinations of these ac-
tions. We build on recent work showing that the ventromedial
prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) correlates with the moral value as-
signed to actions that vary in the distribution of lives saved (Shen-
hav andGreene, 2010) and that itmight integrate inputs from the
amygdala during difficult moral judgments (Shenhav and
Greene, 2014). However, the study goes beyond these papers by
identifying the separate systems involved in computing emo-
tional appraisals, utilitarian appraisals, and overall moral value
judgments. Our results support a model of moral judgment in
which dissociable neural systems compute emotional and utili-
tarian appraisals independently and in parallel, and then pass this
information to be integrated into an overall moral value in an
anterior region of the vmPFC, which has been widely associated
with the computation of value in economic decision-making
(Bartra et al., 2013; Clithero and Rangel, 2014).
Materials andMethods
Subjects. Twenty-eight healthy individuals with normal or corrected-to-
normal vision (12 female; 27 right-handed; mean age  27.71 years;
range 19–38 years) participated in the study. We excluded data for 2
additional participants because of excessive head motion during scan-
ning. Caltech’s Institutional Review Board approved all procedures. Par-
ticipants gave informed consent at the beginning of the study and were
paid $40 for participating.
Study overview. At the beginning of the study, subjects received a brief
overview of the three tasks they would perform in the scanner: (1) an
emotional appraisal task, (2) a utilitarian appraisal task, and (3) an over-
all moral judgment task. The appraisal tasks were designed to identify
regions specialized, respectively, in computing emotional or utilitarian
appraisals for the stimuli. The overall judgment task allowed us to assess
how these separate appraisals were integrated into an overall moral value
for the stimuli.
The experiment consisted of one run each of the appraisal tasks and
three runs of the moral judgment task. Presentation order for the emo-
tional andutilitarian appraisal taskswas counterbalanced across subjects.
The judgment task always occurred afterward. Participants’ heart rate,
respiration, and eye movements were recorded for all functional runs.
After completion of all scans, participants filled out several personality
questionnaires, were debriefed, and paid.
fMRI emotional appraisal task. Subjects were told that they would be
presented with different scenarios. As illustrated in Figure 1, they were
asked to read the scenario, and then to rate their emotional respo-
nse (disgust-repulsion vs attractiveness-praiseworthiness). Participants
were explicitly told to consider only their own emotional responses, and
that although theymight have thoughts about the overall social costs and
benefits of the scenario, they should ignore them in making their rating.
Participants had up to 10 s to respond, using a 4-point rating scale (1
“Extremely appalling” to 4  “Extremely appealing”). The right-to-left
orientation of the rating scale was counterbalanced across subjects, but
was kept consistent within subjects.
Subjects rated 62 different scenarios (31 greater goods and 31 evil
deeds; for examples, see Table 1). The scenarios were designed to be
comprehensible both when presented separately as stand-alone acts dur-
ing the appraisal tasks, and when presented in pairs during the moral
judgment task. Trials were separated by a random intertrial interval (ITI)
ranging from 2 to 7 s (mean 4.3 s).
fMRI utilitarian appraisal task.This task was identical to the emotional
appraisal task, except for the instructions given to subjects. Subjects were
told to consider only the overall costs and benefits of the scenarios de-
scribed (including the effects not just for those directly involved, but also
for those affected indirectly, such as society as a whole). Participants were
also told that, while they might feel strong emotions in response to the
scenarios, they should consider only the costs and benefits in making
their ratings. Participants responded using a similar 4-point rating scale
(1  “Extremely costly” to 4  “Extremely beneficial”). The same 62
scenarios were used in both tasks.
fMRI overall moral judgment task. Subjects had to evaluate the overall
moral appropriateness of moral tradeoffs, which were constructed from
combinations of one stand-alone evil deed and one greater good previ-
ously rated by the subject (e.g., “Waterboard a captured terrorist” and
“Save Los Angeles from terrorist nuclear attack”). As illustrated in Figure
2, the two scenarios were presented on opposite sides of the screen, with
the side of the greater good and evil deed randomized across trials. Sub-
jects were asked to provide a moral value judgment for the combined
option by providing a rating of how appropriate it would be to perform
the evil deed to obtain the greater good (1 “Extremely inappropriate”
to 4 “Extremely appropriate”). They were told to assume that the only
way to achieve the greater good was to perform the evil deed and that, if
they judged it appropriate (rating  3 or 4), both the evil deed and the
greater good would occur exactly as described; but that if they judged it
inappropriate (rating 1 or 2), neither could occur. Participants had up
to 15 s to respond in each trial; 132 moral tradeoffs were constructed
from particular combinations of the 61 stand-alone acts, such that the
Table 1. Example stimulia
Scenario
Mean emotional
rating
Mean utilitarian
rating
Stand-alone evil deeds
Forcibly remove one kidney from an elderly
person who is dying
1.07 0.57
Forcibly remove all organs from a young
healthy child
1.36 1.29
Put out cigarette butts on a captured
terrorist’s face
0.86 0.43
Push large man in front of a runaway bus,
killing him instantly
1.29 1.21
Push large man in front of a runaway bus,
dismembering and killing him slowly via
blood loss
1.43 1.25
Stand-alone greater goods
Save life of another person by transplanting
organs
1.04 0.79
Save life of U.S. president by transplanting
organs
1.04 0.96
Gain information that saves Los Angeles from
a terrorist nuclear weapon
1.36 1.46
Prevent injury of five pedestrians by a
runaway bus
1.29 0.86
Prevent killing of five schoolchildren by
runaway bus
1.25 1.11
aRatingsweremade on a scale from 1 to 4. Means reported in the table were adjusted to have a range running from
1.5 to 1.5 to better distinguish negatively and positively valenced items.
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pair of one evil deed and one greater good always made a sensible com-
plete scenario. The same set of 132 pairs was presented to all subjects, in
an order randomized across subjects, and divided evenly across three
scanning runs. The random ITI ranged from 3 to 5 s (mean 4 s).
MRI data acquisition. Functional imaging data were collected using a
Siemens 3.0 T Tim Trio MRI scanner to acquire gradient echo T2 -
weighted EPI images at a transverse-to-coronal oblique tilt of 20 de-
grees using a 32-channel phased array coil. Each volume comprised 47
axial slices, acquired in an ascendingmanner using the following param-
eters: 30ms TE; 192mmFOV; 3mm isotropic voxel resolution; and 2.5 s
TR. Because participants were allowed to respond freely to each scenario
up to a maximum time limit, the number of TRs differed in each func-
tional run (range  169–278 for the appraisal scans, 111- 205 for the
moral judgment scans).We discarded the first two volumes of each func-
tional run to allow for scanner equilibration. We also acquired a whole-
brain high-resolution T1-weighted structural scan using 1 mm isotropic
voxels for coregistration with the participant’s mean EPI images.
MRI data preprocessing. We performed image analysis using SPM8
software (Wellcome Department of Imaging Neuroscience, Institute of
Neurology, London). Images were corrected for slice acquisition time
within each volume, motion corrected with realignment to the last vol-
ume, spatially normalized to the standard MNI EPI template, and spa-
tially smoothed using an isotropic Gaussian kernel with a FWHM of 8
mm. Intensity normalization and high-pass temporal filtering (filter
width 128 s) were also applied to the data.
MRI data analysis.Weestimated several first-order autoregressiveGLMs
of BOLD response to address the various questions posed by the study. Each
GLMwas estimated in three steps. First, we estimated the model separately
for each individual. Second,we calculated contrast statistics at the individual
level. Third, we computed second-level statistics by performing one-sample
t tests on the single-subject contrast coefficients.
GLM 1. This model was used to identify regions that parametrically
encode the strength of emotional or utilitarian appraisals assigned to
stimuli during the two appraisal tasks. The model had six regressors of
interest. R1 is an indicator function for the decision period during emo-
tional appraisals. R2 is an indicator function for the decision period
during utilitarian appraisals. Both regressors last from trial onset to re-
sponse and thus have a duration equal to the response time on that trial.
R3 and R4 are parametricmodulators of each indicator functionwith the
explicit rating provided on each trial, that is, emotional ratings during the
emotional appraisal task (R3), and utilitarian ratings during the utilitar-
ian appraisal task (R4). R5 and R6 are parametric modulators of each
indicator function giving the rating for the nonrequested appraisal, that
is, the utilitarian ratings that the participant provided, but for the scenar-
ios while shown during the emotional appraisal trial (R5), and vice versa
(R6). Nonrequested ratings were orthogonalized to the explicitly re-
quested ratings (i.e., R5 was orthogonalized to R3, and R6 was orthogo-
nalized with respect to R4). Missed response trials were modeled as a
separate regressor, with a duration of 10 s. All regressors were convolved
with a canonical form of the hemodynamic response function. The
model also included motion parameters and session constants as regres-
sors of no interest.
Several subject-level contrasts were calculated and submitted to a
group random-effects analysis: C1, the contrast R1-R2 characterized re-
gions with stronger average responses during emotional versus utilitar-
ian appraisal tasks; C2, we looked for areas where BOLD response
correlates with emotional appraisals using the parameter estimate for R3;
C3, we looked for areas where BOLD response correlates with utilitarian
appraisals using the parameter estimate for R4; C4, we computed the
difference R3-R4 to look for regions that reflected either utilitarian or
emotional appraisals, but not both; and C5, because all responses for C2
were positive, but all responses for C3were negative, we used the contrast
R2-R3 to look for regions with a different absolute size in the responses
for utilitarian and emotional appraisals.
A variant of this model that included and controlled for reaction time
(RT) as a parametric modulator yielded nearly identical results, and so is
not discussed further here.
GLM 2. This model was used to test whether the regions identified in
GLM 1 also represent emotional and utilitarian appraisals during the
moral judgment task, even though such representations are not explicitly
required. Thismodel was estimated using only themoral judgment trials.
It had the following regressors of interest: R1 consisted of an indicator
function beginning at trial onset and ending when the subject made a
response. R2 was a parametric modulator of R1 with the sum of the
emotional ratings for the evil deed and greater good shown on that trial,
based on the participant’s responses during the appraisal tasks. R3 was a
second parametric modulator of R1 with the sum of the utilitarian rat-
ings, computed in the same manner. The second parametric modulator
was orthogonalized to the first one. Here, and below, all omitted details
are as in GLM 1.
We analyzed the results of this model using an ROI approach designed
to test whether the same areas from GLM 1 also represented emotional
and utilitarian concerns during themoral tradeoff task. This was done by
computing the average estimated coefficient for R2 andR3, separately for
each subject within the ROIs functionally defined using GLM 1 (see Fig.
3), and then comparing them using t tests.
For robustness, we also ran a similar model with the order of paramet-
ric regressors reversed, causing a change in the order of the orthogonal-
ization. This model yielded largely similar results, so is not discussed
further.
GLM 2B. This model was used to test whether encoding of utilitarian
and emotional appraisals during the moral judgment task was choice-
dependent (e.g., stronger if a participant ultimately judged a tradeoff
appropriate instead of inappropriate). The model was identical to GLM
2, with the exception that all regressors of interest were computed sepa-
rately based onwhether the participant ultimately decided that a tradeoff
was appropriate (i.e., response 3, 4 during the tradeoff task) or inap-
propriate (i.e., response 1, 2).
GLM 3. This model was used to identify regions that encode the
overall moral value ratings made during the moral judgment task. It
had two regressors of interest: R1 was an indicator function for moral
judgment trials, with a duration from trial onset to trial response; and
R2 was a parametric modulator of R1 with the appropriateness rating
for that trial. Missed response trials were modeled as a regressor of no
interest (duration  15 s). To identify regions associated with the
computation of overall moral value, we computed a one-sample t test
against zero using the single-subject estimated coefficients from re-
gressor R2.
GLM4. Thismodel was used to identify regions that encode the overall
moral value ratings only at specific times within a decision trial (e.g., only
before response). The model had the following regressors of interest: R1
was an indicator function for the first 2 s of eachmoral judgment trial; R2
was an indicator function for the last 2 s before response of each moral
judgment trial; R3 was a parametric modulator of R1 with the appropri-
ateness rating for the trial; and R4was a parametricmodulator of R2with
the appropriateness rating for the trial. Parametric modulators for the
early and late periods for a given trial are identical, but the correlation
between these regressors when convolved with the hemodynamic re-
sponse is quite low because of themultisecond lag between the beginning
and end of each trial. Missed response trials were modeled as 2 s boxcar
functions representing the first 2 s after trial onset, and another repre-
senting the final 2 s of the trial (13–15 s after trial onset). All other details
are as in GLM 1. These regressors were used to estimate the following
contrasts: C1, correlations with overall appropriateness early in the trial
(R3); C2, correlations with overall appropriateness just before the response
(R4); and C3, the interaction of moral judgment with time (R4-R3).
We report regions as significant if they passedwhole-brain cluster correc-
tion (WBC) at p  0.05 as implemented in SPM8 (Worsley et al., 1996),
using a per-voxel threshold of p 0.001. Regions are also reported if they
survived cluster-level small volume correction (SVC) at p 0.05 within the
following three a priori anatomically defined regions of interest:
1. A vmPFC ROI that included all voxels within the bilateral anterior
cingulate cortex, rectus, and medial orbitofrontal gyrus from the
AAL atlas and inferior to z 0 (2733 voxels). This region encom-
passes the peak voxels related to value computation in several in-
dependent studies, including a region of anterior vmPFC identified
by a meta-analysis of moral decision-making (Bzdok et al., 2012).
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2. A temporoparietal junction (TPJ) ROI that included bilateral an-
gular and superior temporal gyrus, posterior to y  40 (1975
voxels). This region encompasses peaks of activation from several
studies of social cognition and Theory of Mind (Gallagher and
Frith, 2003; Decety and Jackson, 2006; Saxe and Powell, 2006).
3. An amygdalaROI consisting of right and left amygdala as defined in
the AAL atlas (128 voxels), which has been associated with emo-
tional ratings in previous studies of moral judgment (Shenhav and
Greene, 2014).
These ROIs were defined anatomically using the WFU PickAtlas pl-
ugin for SPM (http://fMRI.wfubmc.edu/software/PickAtlas), with a di-
lation of 3 mm to ensure full coverage of the area.
Finite impulse response (FIR) analyses. To examine the time course of
neural activation, we estimated several FIRmodels of the BOLD response
during the moral judgment task. These analyses were designed to shed
light on the timing bywhich the emotional appraisals, utilitarian apprais-
als and overall moral value arise in vmPFC.
FIR 1. This was designed to examine the dynamics of vmPFC repre-
sentations of overall moral value. To do this, we defined an ROI in the
vmPFC based on the set of voxels correlating with overall appropriate-
ness in the final 2 s before the response, thresholded at p 0.001 uncor-
rected (see Fig. 5). From this ROI, we extracted the average raw BOLD
time signal at each time point, removing both the mean and variance
associated with motion regressors using standard SPM functions. The
resulting time course was then up-sampled using spline interpolation
into 10 time bins per TR (250 ms per bin), in a manner similar to the
approach used in several other studies examining the neural time course
of information representation (Boorman et al., 2009; Hutcherson et al.,
2012; Chau et al., 2014).We then estimated a FIR linear regressionmodel
with two regressors for each time point: a constant and the appropriate-
ness rating provided in that trial. The estimated regression coefficients
for the appropriateness ratings at each point in time were used to con-
struct the time course plots and tests in Figure 5.
FIR 2. This model was similar to the previous one, with the exception
of the location of the time bins. These were placed at 250 ms increments
beginning 13 s before and continuing for 7 s after response. This allowed
a complete visualization of hemodynamic responses aligned to the re-
sponses (in contrast, in FIR 1 the time course is aligned to the trial onset).
FIR 3. This model was used to examine the dynamics of the vmPFC
responses to emotional and utilitarian appraisals. The model was similar to
FIR 1, with the exception that it included two parametric regressors for each
timebin: one for the total emotional appraisal of the combined stimulus and
one for the total utilitarian appraisal (for details, see GLM 2).
FIR 4. This model was used to investigate whether parametric ap-
praisal representations were more clearly locked to stimulus onset (as
might be predicted by an attribute integration account), or to the re-
sponses themselves. It was identical to FIR 3, with the exception that the
timewindow of interest ran from 13 s before response until 7 s afterward.
In all of these models, we used permutation tests to assess statistical
significance for each of the above FIR analyses while correcting for the
number of comparisons conducted for the time-points of interest. Spe-
cifically, for each model, we reran the analysis 1000 times, using a ran-
domly permuted order for the trial-level data (i.e., appropriateness
ratings or attribute ratings). The results at each time-point were thresh-
olded at p  0.05 uncorrected, and corrected significance was deter-
mined using the number of consecutively significant time-points
required to protect against false positives at the p 0.05 level during the
6 s window approximating the stimulus evaluation period, adjusting for
the hemodynamic lag (i.e., time-points 17–41).
Temporal variation in functional connectivity. We hypothesized that
each distinct appraisal is passed to vmPFC to be integrated into an overall
moral value. This predicts that there should be an increase in functional
connectivity between the systems computing the appraisals and the
value-related vmPFCduring themoral judgment trials. This prediction is
usually tested in fMRI using a psychophysiological interaction analysis.
However, standard psychophysiological interaction analyses are prob-
lematic in our data because the results of the FIR analyses suggested the
possibility that emotional and utilitarian appraisals are represented in
vmPFC at different times. This in turn implies that the connectivity
between the vmPFC and lower-level regions might show considerable
variability over time within the trial.We addressed this problem by using
a variant of the FIR analyses that allowed us to examine the temporal
profile of connectivity between the vmPFC and regions computing the
separate appraisals.
To do this, we extracted BOLD time courses from three ROIs corre-
lating with emotional appraisals in GLM 1 (i.e., left superior temporal
gyrus [STG], right insula, and anterior cingulate cortex [ACC]), and
three regions correlating with utilitarian appraisals (i.e., right TPJ, left
ventrolateral prefrontal cortex [vlPFC], and the dorsomedial prefrontal
cortex [dmPFC]), using the procedure described in the FIR analyses
above. We then conducted six different FIR linear regression models for
vmPFC responses, one for each source ROI associated with the compu-
tation of emotional or utilitarian appraisals. These models were identical
to FIR 3, except that they also included two additional variables: the
up-sampled activity of the source ROI (e.g., ACC or dmPFC) during
the time points of interest, and the up-sampled activity averaged over the
whole brain to control for nonspecific BOLD effects. The estimated re-
gression coefficients for the source ROI regressor, which measure the
correlation between vmPFC and the source ROI at each time point, were
subjected to a one-sample t test against 0 at the group level. Permutation
tests similar to those described for the FIR analyses determined corrected
levels of significance.
Within- and between-network regional interaction analyses. We per-
formed the following two analyses to investigate the extent to which the
areas involved in computing the different appraisals operate indepen-
dently, or demonstrate competitive inhibition.
First, we computed FIR-based connectivity analyses between the six
ROIs that correlate with either emotional or utilitarian appraisals. Each
analysis was similar to the ones described in the previous section, except
that now it was performed between each pair of the appraisal ROIs,
instead of the vmPFC. As a summary measure of connectivity between
each pair of regions, we averaged all connectivity coefficients from the
average deliberation period duration of themoral judgment task, adjust-
ing for the hemodynamic lag (i.e., the period from 4 to 10 s after onset of
the stimulus). Results are displayed in Figure 7A.
Second, we asked whether the appraisal representations in each of the
six ROIs (i.e., strength of encoding emotional ratings for emotion regions
and utilitarian ratings for utilitarian regions) were correlated either be-
tween areas within a network or between areas across networks. For
emotional appraisal ROIs, we computed the strength of emotional ap-
praisal coding during the moral judgment task (R2 from GLM 2), aver-
aging over all voxels within each region separately. For utilitarian
appraisal ROIs, we computed the strength of utilitarian appraisal coding
(R3 fromGLM2).We then computed the Pearson correlation coefficient
between these measures for each pair of regions. Results are displayed in
Figure 7B.
Results
We begin with an overview of the logic of the study. Subjects
performed three tasks while we measured BOLD responses with
fMRI. First, subjects were shown one morally relevant action at a
time and were asked to provide an emotional appraisal for it
using a 4-point scale (1  “Extremely Appalling” to 4  “Ex-
tremelyAppealing”), considered independently from the action’s
overall social utility. Second, subjects were shown the same stim-
uli and had to provide a utilitarian appraisal describing the social
benefit of the proposed moral act, considered independently
from emotional response (1  “Extremely Costly” to 4  “Ex-
tremely Beneficial”). The proposed moral acts used in these two
tasks ranged from problematic actions, such as “forcibly remov-
ing organs from young children” to more desirable actions, such
as “saving the life of the U.S. president” (Fig. 1A; for sample
stimuli, see Table 1). For convenience, we refer to these as “evil
deeds” and “greater goods,” respectively. The order of the two
appraisal tasks was counterbalanced across subjects. Third, fol-
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lowing the appraisal tasks, subjects completed an overall moral
judgment task (Fig. 2A). Subjects were shown moral dilemmas
that were constructed by combining one of the greater goods and
one of the evil deeds that they had rated previously, and were
asked to provide an overall moral value based on the appropri-
ateness of performing the evil deed to achieve the greater
good (1  “Extremely Inappropriate” to 4  “Extremely
Appropriate”).
We had several hypotheses about how subjects made overall
moral judgments, motivated by the idea that the underlying ar-
chitecture might resemble the one that has been shown to be at
work in some simple economic choice paradigms (Fehr and Ran-
gel, 2011; Lim et al., 2013; Rangel and Clithero, 2014). First, we
hypothesized that the emotional and utilitarian appraisals would
be computed independently in separate sets of regions, during
both the explicit appraisal tasks and the overall judgment task.
Second, we hypothesized that the overall judgment value signal is
encoded in the same vmPFC regions that have been shown to
compute value in amultitude of decision tasks (Bartra et al., 2013;
Clithero andRangel, 2014). Third,we hypothesized that the over-
all value signal is computed by integrating attribute information,
such as the emotional appraisals and the utilitarian appraisals,
within the vmPFC.
Several aspects of the design are worth emphasizing. First, the
appraisal tasks allow us to obtain type-specific appraisals for each
component act, to independently identify regions that encode
each type of appraisal, and to test whether these regions specialize
in representing one type of appraisal. Second, we can estimate the
emotional and utilitarian appraisals of the combined acts, by
adding together the appraisals of the greater good and evil deed
elicited during the appraisal tasks. This allows us to look for re-
gions encoding emotional and utilitarian appraisals during the
overall moral judgment task, even though such ratings were not
explicitly provided by the subject. Third, by identifying systems
associated with different appraisals, we can test the hypothesis
that emotional and utilitarian appraisals are computed mostly
independently by looking for interactions between their neural
representations. For example, some models propose that the
emotional and utilitarian systems compete throughmutual inhi-
bition, with the winner taking control of behavior (Greene et al.,
2004; Cushman, 2013), which predicts a negative correlation be-
tween the two representations.
Behavior: appraisal tasks
Participantswere faster to provide emotional appraisals thanutilitarian
appraisals (MEmotional  3632 ms, SE  164; MUtilitarian  4025 ms,
SE  171; paired t(27)  2.5, p  0.02; Fig. 1B), consistent with the
hypothesis that theymight be supportedbydifferent processes.Despite
this RT difference, emotional and utilitarian ratings were strongly cor-
related within subjects (Fig. 1C; mean r  0.78). However, this high
correlation was in part an artifact of collapsing over evil deeds and
greater goods. Computing the correlation between emotional and util-
itarian ratings only within evil deeds, or only within greater goods,
yielded more modest relationships (mean r evil deeds 0.42, mean r
greater goods 0.28).
Behavior: moral judgment task
Participants judged the combination of evil acts and greater
goods as appropriate (i.e., a value of 3 or 4) on 56 4% (mean
SD) of trials. For every subject, we estimated a linear regression of
the overall moral value on the overall emotional appraisal (given
Figure 1. Emotional and utilitarian appraisal tasks for stand-alone acts.A, Trial structure.B,
Average response times ( SE) to make emotional (red) or utilitarian (blue) appraisals. *p
0.05. C, Relationship between emotional and utilitarian ratings for the same act. Each point
indicates the ratingsmadeby a single subject for a single act,with redpoints indicating ahigher
emotional rating for the same act, blue points indicating a higher utilitarian rating, and gray
points indicating the same rating.
Figure 2. Overallmoral judgment task for combined acts.A, Trial structure.B, Average influence
on overall moral values of overall emotional appraisals (red), overall utilitarian appraisals (blue), or
their interaction (gray). Error bars indicate SEM. **p 0.001. †p 0.06. ns, Not significant.
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by the sum of the subject’s emotional appraisals for the evil deed
and greater good on that trial), the overall utilitarian appraisal
(defined similarly), and their interaction. This regression pro-
vides a behavioral test of the hypothesis that the overall moral
value reflects the integration of emotional and utilitarian apprais-
als, among other types of information. The within-subject corre-
lation between the two regressors was low tomoderate (mean r
0.33), which means that the regression is able to estimate the
contribution of both types of appraisals. Estimated subject-level
coefficientswere submitted to one-sample t tests to determine the
significance of each factor. As shown in Figure 2B, both emo-
tional and utilitarian appraisals contributed significantly to over-
all judgments (MEmotional  0.256  0.054, one-sample t(27) 
4.66, p 0.001; MUtilitarian 0.265 0.038, one-sample t(27)
7.22, p  0.001), with no significant difference between them
(paired t(27) 0.12, p 0.91). We observed a marginally signif-
icant interaction effect (MInteraction  0.096  0.049, one-
sample t(27) 1.97, p 0.06, two-tailed), which had a veryminor
contribution to the variance explained by the regression (mean
increase in R2 of 0.02). Together, these results are consistent with
the hypothesis that overall moral value reflects the integration of
emotional and utilitarian appraisals, with a weak or nonexistent
interaction between them.
Average neural responses in the appraisal tasks
The key neural hypotheses of the study involve the existence of areas
withneuralresponsesthatparametricallyencodetheemotionalapprais-
als, the utilitarian appraisals, or the overall moral values. However, to
facilitatecomparisonwithprevious literature inmoral judgment,which
has often focused on cross-condition comparison, in this section we
compare the average BOLD responses during the emotional and utili-
tarian appraisal tasks (for details, see GLM 1). We found that supple-
mentary motor area (p  0.05, WBC, peak at 9, 26, 31) and left
amygdala (p0.04, SVC,peak at24, 2,23) exhibited greater aver-
ageBOLDresponsesduring theemotionalvaluerating task.Noregions
had significantly greater average activation during the utilitarian ap-
praisal task.
Appraisal signals during the appraisal tasks
We began the primary analyses by looking for regions in which
the BOLD responses were parametrically correlated with the
emotional or utilitarian appraisals during the appraisal tasks (for
details, see GLM 1). In these tasks, subjects are expected to com-
pute each respective type of appraisal because they have to report
it. This allows us to independently identify areas associated with
representing each type of appraisal, without assuming or requir-
ing that such appraisals be used during the moral judgment task
(e.g., some subjects might be able to report utilitarian appraisals
when asked, but might not compute or use this information to
make moral judgments).
We found a dissociation between areas that reflected the emo-
tional and utilitarian appraisals (Fig. 3; Table 2). Emotional ap-
praisals correlated positively with BOLD responses in anterior
cingulate cortex (ACC; p  0.05, whole-brain corrected), right
superior temporal gyrus (STG; p 0.05,WBC), and, marginally,
in right mid-insula (p  0.07, WBC) and left STG (p  0.08,
WBC). No such correlation was observed in the amygdala, even
atmuch lower significance levels, nor did we observe a significant
correlation between amygdala and emotional appraisals when
analyzing negative or positive emotional scenarios separately (all
p values  0.05 uncorrected). In contrast, utilitarian appraisals
correlated with BOLD responses in the dorsomedial prefrontal
cortex (dmPFC; p 0.05, WBC), ventrolateral prefrontal cortex
(vlPFC; p  0.05, WBC), and right temporoparietal junction
(TPJ; p 0.05, SVC). Intriguingly, and in contrast to emotional
appraisals, representations in each of these regions correlated
negatively with utilitarian appraisals (i.e., responding more
strongly for costly actions than beneficial ones). No correlation
with utilitarian appraisals was observed in areas of the dorsolat-
eral prefrontal cortex that respond to selection of utilitarian op-
tions during difficult personal moral dilemmas (Greene et al.,
2001; Greene et al., 2004), even at a liberal threshold of p 0.05
uncorrected.
These findings suggest that emotional and utilitarian apprais-
als are computed in dissociable regions. To better understand the
specificity of response to emotional and utilitarian appraisals, we
performed two additional whole-brain analyses (Table 2). First,
we looked for areas with a significant difference between the co-
efficients for utilitarian and emotional appraisals (i.e., where the
difference Util Emot was significantly different from 0). This
analysis identified only the right TPJ (p 0.07, WBC; p 0.05,
SVC, peak x, y, z 45,61, 31), where the difference was driven
by a negative correlation with utilitarian appraisals that was sig-
nificantly different from the association with emotional apprais-
als. Unfortunately, interpretation of this contrast is complicated
by the fact that emotional appraisals were generally represented
positively, whereas utilitarian appraisals were generally repre-
sented negatively. Given this, we performed a second more de-
manding analysis, in which we looked for regions where the
negative response to the utilitarian appraisals was significantly
different from the positive response to the emotional appraisals
(i.e., where the differenceUtilEmot was significantly different
from 0). This analysis identified regions of both dmPFC and
vlPFCwhere the negative response to the utilitarian appraisal was
stronger than the positive response to the emotional appraisal, as
well as a region encompassing both ACC and the ventral striatum
where the positive response to the emotional appraisal was stron-
ger than the negative response to utilitarian appraisals (all p val-
ues 0.05, WBC). For illustrative purposes only, given the
nonindependent nature of the analysis, Figure 3 depicts the aver-
age estimated regression coefficients for the two types of ratings
in each of the ROIs identified by these results.
The results in this section suggest that emotional appraisals of
moral acts are dominant in ACC and that the opposite is true in
dmPFC and vlPFC. Figure 3 suggests that right mid-insula and
the left STG may also exhibit dominant representations of emo-
tional appraisals and that the right TPJ may exhibit a dominant
representation of utilitarian appraisals, but the dissociation tests
for these regions were inconclusive within the statistical power
offered by this dataset.
Appraisal signals during the overall moral judgment task
The next step in the analysis asks whether the areas encoding
emotional and utilitarian appraisals during the appraisal tasks,
when subjects are required to compute them, also encode them in
the same way during the moral judgment task, when they are not
explicitly asked to do so. This provides a test of the hypothesis
that emotional and utilitarian appraisals are computed during
the process of making a moral judgment. We used the areas
identified in the previous analysis to functionally define ROIs
associated with appraisal-specific computations, and then asked
whether these regions still reflected these representations during
the overall moral judgment of tradeoffs (for details, see GLM 2).
For the most part, we found that the appraisal-specific represen-
tations persisted in the moral judgment task, and with the same
sign (Fig. 4). Right insula, left STG, and ACC responses all corre-
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Figure3. Neural correlates of emotional and utilitarian appraisals for stand-alone acts. Different regions correlatedwith the two types of appraisals during the emotional appraisal task
(A) and the utilitarian appraisal task (B). Hot colors represent a positive correlation. Cold colors represent a negative correlation. Images thresholded at p 0.001, uncorrected. Bar plots
represent correlation with emotional and utilitarian appraisals and are shown for visualization purposes only. Error bars indicate SEM. *p 0.05. **p 0.01.
Table 2. Neural correlates of emotional appraisals, utilitarian appraisals, and overall moral judgmentsa
Region BA Volume Z x y z
Correlation with emotional appraisals
Right Anterior cingulate cortex 24/32 124 4.42 6 35 16
Right Superior temporal gyrus 22 70 3.85 48 10 5
Right Parahippocampal gyrus 36 54 4.04 24 34 14
Right Mid-insula 13 48 3.77* 36 19 10
Left Occipital cortex 18 47 4.04* 21 85 13
Left Superior temporal gyrus 22 46 3.89* 54 13 2
Correlation with utilitarian appraisals
Left Dorsomedial prefrontal cortex 8 200 4.27 6 17 58
Left Ventrolateral prefrontal cortex 45/47 110 4.46 48 26 5
Right Temporoparietal junction 40 30 3.76** 48 55 25
Emotional appraisals (positive) utilitarian appraisals (negative)
Left Ventral striatum 273† 6.04 9 22 9
Right Anterior cingulate cortex 24 3.92 3 35 7
Utilitarian appraisals (negative) emotional appraisals (positive)
Right Dorsomedial prefrontal cortex 8 112 4.76 9 35 52
Left Ventrolateral prefrontal cortex 45/47 90 4.11 39 26 8
Correlation with overall moral value (full period)
No regions significant
Correlation with overall moral value (first 2 s)
No regions significant
Correlation with overall moral value (last 2 s)
Right Ventromedial prefrontal cortex 10 17 4.11†† 0 53 2
aRegions are reported at p 0.05, whole-brain corrected, unless otherwise noted.
*p 0.08, whole-brain corrected, reported for completeness. **p 0.05, small-volume corrected within a bilateral anatomical mask of the temporoparietal area. †Part of larger cluster, reported for completeness. ††p 0.05,
small-volume corrected within a bilateral anatomical mask of vmPFC.
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lated significantly and positively with the overall emotional ap-
praisal (i.e., the sumof the emotional ratings for the evil deed and
greater good on each trial, all p values0.05) but did not corre-
late with the overall utilitarian appraisal (i.e., the sum of the
utilitarian ratings for the evil deed and greater good on each trial).
In contrast, right TPJ and dmPFC (though not the vlPFC) corre-
lated significantly and negatively with the overall utilitarian ap-
praisal (all p values 0.05) but did not correlate with overall
emotional value. In addition, we found no significant differences
in the strength of emotional or utilitarian attribute coding in any
of these regions as a function of whether the participant ulti-
mately judged the tradeoff as appropriate or inappropriate (for
detils, see GLM 2B).
These results suggest that emotional and utilitarian appraisals
are represented in largely specialized regions during moral judg-
ment and that these are the same regions that encode explicitly
requested appraisals. In addition, the fact that the appraisal rep-
resentations are not affected by the moral judgment made (i.e.,
appropriate vs inappropriate) is consistent with the hypothesis
that the appraisals are computed independently. It is less consis-
tent with a model in which the two representations mutually
inhibit each other in a winner-take-all competition.
Overall moral values are represented in vmPFC
Next, we tested the hypothesis that overall moral values are
represented in vmPFC during the moral judgment task, as
might be expected from studies of simple value-based choice.
We did this by looking for areas in which BOLD responses
correlated with overall moral value, either averaged over the
whole decision period or in the moments just before the par-
ticipant made a response (for details, see GLM 3 and GLM 4).
Although no regions significantly correlated with moral value
when analyzing the decision-period as a whole, we observed a
single area exhibiting a significant positive correlation with
the overall moral value in the 2 s before response, located in
the anterior vmPFC (p  0.05, SVC; peak at 0, 53, 2; Fig.
5A). In contrast, there were no regions that correlated signif-
icantly with overall moral value in the first 2 s after trial onset.
Time course analyses using an FIR model of responses within
this vmPFC region (Fig. 5B) confirmed that the overall moral
value signal emerged shortly before a participant made the
final response. Furthermore, when responses were analyzed
time-locked to the onset of the trial, this region showed a
significant but prolonged and smeared out correlation with
the overall moral value, centered just before and during the
average response time. In contrast, when the analysis was time
locked to the response itself, vmPFC activity exhibited a sharp
increase in correlation with the overall moral value just before
a response was made. Together, these results are consistent
with the hypothesis that an overall moral value signal arises in
vmPFC just before the time of response.
Attribute value representations in the integrative
vmPFC region
Next, we performed two separate analyses to test the hypothesis that
the overall moral value signal in vmPFC reflects the integration of
emotional and utilitarian appraisal information, and to probe how
this integration evolves over the course of the decision.
We first asked whether the vmPFC represented both emo-
tional and utilitarian appraisals during the moral judgment task,
as predicted by the hypothesis that the overall moral value en-
coded here reflects the integration of both types of appraisals. In
particular, we analyzed the time course of responses in the region
of vmPFC identified above, using an FIR model to determine
Figure 4. Representations of emotional and utilitarian appraisals persist in the moral judgment task. A, Response in regions associated with emotional appraisals during the appraisal tasks
correlatedwith the overall emotional appraisal during themoral judgment task but did not correlatewith the overall utilitarian appraisal.B, Response in regions associatedwith utilitarian appraisal
during the appraisal tasks correlatedwith overall utilitarian appraisal of the tradeoff during the judgment task but did not correlatewith overall emotional appraisals. Regionalmasks used to extract
these values are shown in the upper corner of each graph andwere defined using the set of voxels that correlated at a significance level of p 0.001with emotional or utilitarian appraisals in GLM
1. Error bars indicate SEM. *p 0.05. **p 0.01. †p 0.07. ns, Not significant.
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whether and when the activity in this ROI correlated with the
overall emotional or utilitarian appraisals of each proposed
moral action. Consistent with the integration hypothesis, we
found a significant correlation with both emotional and utilitar-
ian attributes (Fig. 5C). The correlation began with a rapidly
emerging but brief sensitivity to the overall emotional appraisals
(beginning at t  3.25 s following stimulus onset and lasting
1.25 s at p 0.05 uncorrected; p 0.1 permutation corrected), a
slightly delayed but longer period of negative correlation with
overall utilitarian appraisals (beginning at t  4.25 s and lasting
2.75 s at p 0.05 uncorrected; p 0.02 permutation corrected),
and finally a return to a more sustained positive correlation with
emotional appraisals (beginning at t 7.25 s and lasting for 3 s at
p 0.05 uncorrected; p 0.006 permutation corrected).
Figure 5 depicts the evolution of the two appraisal signals. It
suggests that the earliest correlation with emotional and utilitar-
ian appraisals in the vmPFC emerged2–3 s earlier in time than
the correlation with overall moral value, consistent with the idea
that the appraisals provide inputs to this area that are subse-
quently integrated into an overall moral value. Further bolstering
this interpretation, the sensitivity of the vmPFC to emotional or
utilitarian appraisals was more sharply tuned to the onset of the
trial andwas weaker andmore smeared out whenwe repeated the
analysis time-locked to the moment of response (Fig. 5C, right).
We next tested a corollary of the value integration hypothesis:
if the information about emotional and utilitarian appraisals
within vmPFC reflects inputs from appraisal-specific areas (e.g.,
insula, ACC, TPJ, or dmPFC), then the vmPFC should exhibit
increases in functional connectivity with these source regions at
the time of making a moral judgment. As described in Materials
and Methods, this analysis is complicated by the fact that inputs
from these specialized regions may arise in vmPFC at different
times (as suggested by the RT and neural differences reported
above). As a result, connectivity between the vmPFC and areas
representing these attributes may vary considerably over the
course of a trial. In this case, a standard connectivity analysis
using psychophysiological interaction models is problematic be-
cause it assumes that the precise timing of a psychological period
of interest is known and that connectivity during this period is
constant. To sidestep this problem, we performed a different type
of functional connectivity analysis. In particular, we extracted the
time course of BOLD responses from each of the ROIs associated
with either emotional or utilitarian appraisals and then per-
formed an FIR-like analysis to estimate the correlation between
activity in each these regions and the vmPFC at different points
over the course of the moral judgment trials (for details, see Ma-
terials and Methods).
We found only two regions exhibiting significant connectivity
profiles with vmPFC during overall moral judgment. For the
ACC region associated with emotional appraisals (Fig. 6A), we
observed a significant degree of correlation with the vmPFC dur-
ing the whole trial (beginning at t 0 and lasting 15 s at p 0.05
uncorrected, p 0.001 permutation corrected), with a temporal
profile consisting of an earlier and a later peak that matched the
temporal profile of vmPFC sensitivity to emotional value. For the
dmPFC region associated with utilitarian appraisals (Fig. 6B),
we observed a more temporally circumscribed period of connec-
tivity that lined up with the moments during which the vmPFC
displayed the most sensitivity to the utilitarian appraisal of the
tradeoff (beginning at t 5 s and lasting 2.5 s at p 0.05 uncor-
Figure 5. Neural correlates of overall value in themoral judgment task.A, A region of the vmPFC correlatedwith overallmoral value in the 2 s before response.B, Time course of the overallmoral
value signal in this region, locked either to onset of the tradeoff (left), or the response (right). These time courses are included for display purposes only and do not represent independent tests. C,
Time course in vmPFC of the overall emotional appraisal (red), and overall utilitarian appraisal (blue), locked to onset (left) or response (right). Lighter shaded areas represent SEM. Lines at the top
of the charts indicate time-points where the associationwas significant at p 0.05, uncorrected formultiple comparisons. Gray vertical shading represents a visual aid for the approximate time of
stimulus onset and response time, adjusted for the hemodynamic lag.
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rected; p 0.07 permutation corrected). This patternwas unique
to these two regions: the other ROIs exhibiting appraisal-specific
responses, such as the TPJ or insula, showed either no significant
functional connectivity with the vmPFC, or comparatively brief
periods of connectivity that were not aligned with the timing of
representations within the vmPFC (data not shown).
Together, the results in this section are consistent with the
hypothesis that the overall moral value signal in vmPFC reflects
the integration of emotional appraisals encoded in ACC, and of
utilitarian appraisals encoded in dmPFC. Interestingly, the anal-
yses are also suggestive that appraisal information might precede
the appearance of the integrated overall moral value, although
this result is more tentative.
Interaction between appraisal systems during the moral
judgment task
The results described so far are consistent with a model of moral
judgment in which separate systems independently compute emo-
tional andutilitarianappraisals,whichare then integrated invmPFC
to compute an overall moral value. In contrast with this hypothesis,
several influential models have proposed that moral judgment in-
volves inhibitory competition of the emotion and utilitarian ap-
praisal regions, with the overall judgment being determined by the
winner (Greene et al., 2001, 2004, 2008; Cushman et al., 2010). Our
final analyses perform additional tests of the inhibitory model.
First, we looked for functional connectivity patterns within and
across the six ROIs that correlate with emotional or utilitarian ap-
praisals. To do this, we estimated the average pairwise connectivity
between all these regions while participants made judgments in the
moral tradeoff task (for details, see Materials and Methods). As
shown in Figure 7A, we observed significant within-system connec-
tivity (insula-ACC, p  0.03 Bonferroni corrected for 15 separate
comparisons; insula-STG, p  0.001 corrected; TPJ-dmPFC, p 
0.01 corrected; IFG-dmPFC, p 0.04 uncorrected, p not signifi-
cant corrected).However, cross-system interactionswere not signif-
icant,with the exceptionof negative functional interactions between
thedmPFCandbothright insula (p0.002, corrected)and left STG
(p 0.001, corrected). Most notably, there were no significant in-
teractions between the key regions of ACC and dmPFC that corre-
lated with specific appraisals and exhibited connectivity with
vmPFC.
Second, we looked for correlations in the strength of the repre-
sentation of the dominant appraisals in each region (e.g., emotional
for ACC, utilitarian for dmPFC), for each pair of regions during the
moral judgment task. This analysis allowed us to ask whether indi-
vidualswhorepresentutilitarianappraisalsmore strongly in regions,
such as the dmPFC or TPJ, represent emotional appraisals more
weakly in theACCor insula, aswould be expected in the presence of
inhibitory competitionbetween the twosystems.As shown inFigure
7B, results mirrored the patterns observed in regional connectivity:
representations within the emotional appraisal network tended to
positively correlate with each other (insula-ACC, r(26) 0.47, p
0.01 uncorrected, p not significant, Bonferroni corrected, insula-
STG, r(26) 0.55, p 0.03 corrected), as did representations within
Figure6. Time course of connectivity between vmPFC and appraisal-specific regions.A, vmPFC andACC connectivity (black line)was significant throughout the trial,with peaks around the times
at which the vmPFC showed significant correlation to the overall emotional appraisals (red line). B, vmPFC and dmPFC connectivity (black line) was significant during the same time-period that
vmPFCbecame showed significant correlation to overall utilitarian appraisals (blue line). Lighter shadedareas represent SEM. Lines at the topof the charts indicate time-pointswhere the association
was significant at p 0.05, uncorrected. Gray vertical shading represents a visual aid for the approximate time of stimulus onset and response time, adjusted for the hemodynamic lag.
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the utilitarian appraisal network (TPJ-dmPFC, r(26)  0.61, p 
0.008 corrected). However, cross-system representations did not
correlate significantly,with the exceptionof amarginal negative cor-
relation between utilitarian appraisals in the dmPFC and emotional
appraisals in the insula (r(26)0.37,p0.05uncorrected,pnot
significant, corrected). These results provide additional support for
the hypothesis that emotional and utilitarian appraisals are com-
puted largely independently. We emphasize that the nature of the
analyses cannot rule out the existence of some inhibitory interac-
tions but suggests that their magnitude is likely to be small.
Discussion
Although considerable evidence suggests that moral judg-
ments are influenced by emotional appraisals and utilitarian
considerations (Suter and Hertwig, 2011; Amit and Greene,
2012; Conway and Gawronski, 2013), the neurocomputa-
tional basis of these signals, and how they interact to produce
moral judgments, remains unclear. Our results support a rel-
atively simple characterization of these processes. First, we
found that anterior cingulate, insula, and superior temporal
gyrus represent emotional appraisals, whereas temporopari-
etal junction and dorsomedial prefron-
tal cortex reflect utilitarian appraisals.
Second, we found overall moral values
represented in a separate region of
vmPFC, similar but somewhat anterior
to areas that encode decision values dur-
ing simple economic choices (Bartra et
al., 2013; Clithero and Rangel, 2014).
Third, the pattern of responses within
these regions, and their functional con-
nectivity, supports the hypothesis that
emotional and utilitarian appraisals are
computed largely independently, and
passed to the vmPFC to be integrated
into an overall moral value.
Separate neural systems compute
emotional and utilitarian appraisals
Previous work in this area has typically
focused on differences in average activa-
tion between different types of moral di-
lemmas, such as those with or without
negative, emotionally evocative features
(Greene et al., 2001), having more or
less conflict (FeldmanHall et al., 2014),
or resulting in more or less utilitarian
choices (Greene et al., 2004). These
studies have provided invaluable insight
into the dimensions shaping moral
judgment and have established the in-
volvement of regions, such as amygdala,
TPJ, lateral prefrontal cortex, and
vmPFC. However, they were not de-
signed to identify the specific computa-
tions performed in these regions or to
study how information flows between
them. One notable exception is work by
Shenhav and Greene (2014). This study
tied amygdala response to overall nega-
tive emotional appraisals during moral
judgment but did not report any regions
in which responses correlated paramet-
rically with utilitarian appraisals. More-
over, the study used complex tradeoff scenarios involving
choices between two options, each with multiple components
(e.g., push a man to his death and save five lives vs spare him
and allow others to die) and did not collect subject-specific
information on the different aspects of every option under
consideration, which makes it impossible to address the ques-
tions of our study.
In contrast, our experiment was designed to identify sepa-
rately regions encoding emotional appraisals, utilitarian ap-
praisals, overall moral values, and the interactions among
them. Our results suggest caution in interpreting previous
findings. Although average amygdala response in our study
was higher when rating emotional appraisals, this response did
not correlate with idiosyncratic emotional ratings to stand-
alone acts, which instead were encoded in areas such as insula,
STG, and ACC. Previous work has shown stronger dorsolat-
eral prefrontal cortex when the utilitarian option is favored
(Greene et al., 2004). Although we had thus hypothesized that
the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex might therefore represent
utilitarian appraisals, we found more reliably encoding in re-
Figure 7. Interactionwithin and between the emotional and utilitarian appraisal networks during themoral judgment task.A,
Pairwise functional connectivity between regions, determined using FIR analyses and averaged over the time-points correspond-
ing to the evaluation period. Colors represent the average regression coefficient across subjects. Black represents significant
connectivity ( p 0.05, uncorrected for multiple comparisons). B, Pairwise correlations between regions in the strength of the
representation of the dominant attribute, computed for each individual using the estimated coefficients from GLM 2. Colors
represent correlation coefficients. Black represents significant correlations ( p 0.05, uncorrected).
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gions implicated in social cognition and Theory of Mind, such
as the TPJ and dmPFC (Van Overwalle, 2009; Bzdok et al.,
2012). To be clear, we do not view our findings as a definite
refutation of previous interpretations of the computations
performed in areas such as amygdala or dorsolateral prefron-
tal cortex, because multiple differences between the experi-
mental paradigmsmake direct comparison difficult. However,
our results underscore the need for further study in determin-
ing both when regions like these come on line during moral
judgment, as well as the specific computations they perform.
Intriguingly, we also found that vlPFC and right STG re-
sponses correlated with utilitarian or emotional appraisals
only during explicit rating tasks, whereas other regions
showed consistent correlations even during the moral judg-
ment task. Moreover, only ACC and dmPFC showed connec-
tivity profiles consistent with passing information to the
vmPFC for integration into an overall moral value. It is natural
to speculate that ACC and dmPFC may themselves integrate
lower-level features, perhaps represented in regions, such as
amygdala, insula, STG, and TPJ, and could serve as relay sta-
tions that transform information into content usable by
vmPFC.
Our results are consistent with previous work tying the
ACC to emotional experience (Phan et al., 2002; Kober et al.,
2008), and linking dmPFC and TPJ to moral judgment and
social cognition (Bzdok et al., 2012). However, the role of
regions like the mid-insula or STG in emotional representa-
tion remains less clear in the literature. Previous work some-
times associates mid-insula with pain processing (Wager et al.,
2013), which could inform emotional appraisals invoked in
our experiment. However, neither the mid-insula nor STG
regions fall within canonical emotion circuits. Future work
will thus need to determine the precise computations repre-
sented in these regions, including the representation of attri-
butes beyond emotional and utilitarian appraisals. For
example, real-world moral choices with selfish benefits often
differ from hypothetical judgments (FeldmanHall et al.,
2012), which suggests that additional attributes are informing
judgment.
Implications for models of moral judgment
Our results support a nuanced version of the dual-systems
view of moral choice (Greene et al., 2001; Haidt, 2001; Greene,
2005; Cushman et al., 2010; Conway and Gawronski, 2013;
Cushman, 2013). Consistent with prior work, we find evi-
dence that moral judgments are informed by emotional and
utilitarian appraisals and that these appraisals are computed in
nonoverlapping systems. However, our results do not support
a model in which these systems directly inhibit each other in
winner-take-all competition because we found only a negligible
interactioneffect inbehavior, andnosignificant interactioneffects in
neural representations. Instead, our results support a simple attri-
bute integrationmodel, in which emotional and utilitarian apprais-
als are computed in distinct systems, which we here identify with
ACC and dmPFC, respectively. These appraisals are integrated into
an overall value judgment in a separate region of vmPFC.
The simple attribute integration model predicts that moral
judgments are likely influenced by multiple attributes in par-
allel and suggests an important open question: what deter-
mines the relative weight that the attributes receive in the
decision? Although utilitarian and emotional appraisals influ-
enced judgments equally in the current context, it is natural to
hypothesize that emotional appraisals might be more easily
represented and weighted in other contexts because introspec-
tion and previous research suggest that they are harder to
suppress than more deliberative utilitarian attributes.
Our results also shed light on models of the relationship
between emotion and cognition in moral judgment. For ex-
ample, in some theories, deliberative utilitarian consider-
ations are simply post hoc justifications for emotional
intuitions (Haidt et al., 1993; Haidt, 2001; Wheatley and
Haidt, 2005; Schnall et al., 2008). Under this view, we might
expect emotional appraisal regions, such as ACC and insula, to
also be associated with the ratings in the utilitarian appraisal
task. Yet, despite sizable correlation between the two apprais-
als, we found no overlap in the areas associated with them.
The neural bases of moral judgment
Our results suggest that complex moral decisions operate on
many of the same principles at work in simple economic de-
cisions (Fehr and Rangel, 2011; Rangel and Clithero, 2014),
albeit with some important differences. Most studies of simple
choice find overall-value signals in a region of the cingulate
cortex closer to where we observed emotional appraisal repre-
sentations (Kable and Glimcher, 2007; Bartra et al., 2013;
Clithero and Rangel, 2014). Integrated moral value signals fell
in a more anterior area of vmPFC that has been associated with
the computation of more abstract values (Chib et al., 2009;
McNamee et al., 2013; Clithero and Rangel, 2014). Although
the location of this area is consistent with other studies of
moral decision-making (Bzdok et al., 2012), it suggests a gra-
dient of response in the vmPFC.
We also find that utilitarian appraisals are encoded nega-
tively in dmPFC and TPJ (i.e., greater activity for less desirable
values). Although we were surprised by this result, it is consis-
tent with related work showing stronger TPJ responses to bad
compared with good actions (Yoder and Decety, 2014). We
emphasize that there is no a priori reason why the utilitarian
appraisal code must be positive because measures of social
cost (negative code) and social benefit (positive code) are
equally useful in moral judgments. The significance and ro-
bustness of the negative code for utilitarian appraisals, and
how this sign is flipped in overall value, represent an impor-
tant question for future research.
Temporal dynamics of moral judgment
Despite the relatively low temporal resolution of fMRI (but for
evidence of greater temporal sensitivity than previously as-
sumed, see Katwal et al., 2012), we found changes in the signals
represented in vmPFC over the course of a decision. For ex-
ample, signals related to emotional and utilitarian appraisals
appeared in this region at different times, and before repre-
sentations of overall moral value. However, we observed little
evidence that the earlier appearance of emotional appraisal
signals resulted in a stronger average influence of emotional
appraisals on choice behavior, perhaps because participants
had sufficient time to integrate all the information. Time pres-
sure influences decisions in a wide variety of paradigms, in-
cluding nonsocial, social but nonmoral, and moral tasks (Ben
Zur and Breznitz, 1981; Suter and Hertwig, 2011; Rand et al.,
2012). Future work should investigate how time pressure af-
fects the computations identified here and how this changes
moral judgment.
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